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Viewing 10 of 686 digest sections entitled “Cyber security”, “Claim 1 The U.S. Intelligence community is said to have concluded with “high confidence” that the Russians hacked computers of U.S. political organizations and email communications of individuals involved in the U.S. presidential campaign.”, “Cyber security and alleged Russia interference in the U.S. electoral campaign”, “Phone conversation between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin on May 2”, “Special section on the list of senior Russian political figures and oligarchs published by the U.S. Treasury Department as potential sanction targets”, “Belarus”, “Cyber”, “Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally”
Russia Analytical Report, Oct. 27–Nov. 3, 2025
Cyber security
“‘Digital War’—A New Reality,” Yuri Baluevsky & Ruslan Pukhov, Russia in Global Affairs, 10.29.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.
- The authors argue, “A ‘drone revolution’ and, more broadly, ‘digital war’ is permanently reshaping military affairs, with swarms of increasingly small, cheap, and autonomous drones dominating the battlefield.”
- They state, “Transparency is a defining feature—surveillance, sensors, and networks are erasing the ‘fog of war’ and creating a unified global information battlespace across land, air, and space.”
- Baluevsky and Pukhov note, “This transparency, seen in Ukraine, has increased force dispersion and made covert concentration of troops nearly impossible, fundamentally changing combat doctrine.”
- “Starlink and commercial cellular networks now enable real-time, long-range control of drones and battlefield communications—including down to individual soldiers,” they write.
- The authors suggest, “Artillery and tanks—built for direct-fire confrontation—are losing relevance as drones and precision weapons allow indirect, remote strikes without line of sight.”
- They observe, “Drone warfare is driving radical restructuring of military organizations, demanding extreme force dispersion, deeper engagement ranges, and new logistics solutions.”
- “FPV drones are now the main weapon against both equipment and personnel, accounting for over 70% of Russian casualties as of early 2025,” the authors report.
- “Successful adaptation to drone warfare requires integrating drone swarms, robotics, and counter-drone measures at every level, with networked coordination,” they conclude.
- The article warns, “Mass-market drone platforms from China and the U.S. drive the war’s pace; Russia’s inability to match computing power and data networks threatens its strategic position.”
- Baluevsky and Pukhov stress, “Unless Russia invests now in computational capacity and networked systems, it risks falling irreversibly behind in digital warfare.”
Cyber
“Why China and Russia Aren’t Scared of the U.S.,” Hal Brands, Bloomberg, 10.29.25.
- Brands argues, “Trump has mostly wielded U.S. power against weaker actors, but is now facing greater challenges from Russia and China, which are determined to prove his toughness is bluff.”
- He notes, “Putin has made a mockery of Trump’s Ukraine peace push, intensifying attacks and demanding maximalist terms, while seeking to weaken NATO and humiliate the U.S..”
- Brands observes, “China has repeatedly responded to Trump’s tariffs with harsh retaliation, leaving Beijing confident it holds the upper hand in ongoing trade disputes.”
- He writes, “Russia and China pursue ambitious projects that directly clash with U.S. interests, showing little fear of Trump’s assertive rhetoric or threats.”
- Brands contends, “Checking their power now would require Trump to develop a longer attention span, focus on long-term strategy, and patiently build alliances—rather than seeking quick wins.”
- He adds, “Trump will also need to prioritize cooperation with U.S. allies to pressure Russia and China, rather than treating partners as targets of tough tactics.”
- Brands concludes, “For Moscow and Beijing, American political polarization makes the U.S. appear divided and less formidable, reinforcing their confidence in challenging Washington.”
“Russia’s Far East Policy: Looking Beyond China,” Stephen Blank, IFRI, 08.24.10.
- Blank writes, “Moscow’s failure to realize successful economic cooperation with Japan or meaningfully advance its interests regarding North Korea leaves it with no choice but to emphasize China as its primary partner.”
- He argues, “Russia is becoming increasingly dependent upon China, coordinating closely on Korea, the Russian Far East, and Central Asia, exposing Moscow’s inability to play the role of a great power in Asia.”
- Blank explains, “Russia’s development plans for the Far East must now be coordinated with China’s regional strategy; Medvedev has acknowledged that large-scale projects depend on Chinese investment.”
- He notes, “Rapid Chinese economic growth has widened the gap with Russia, whose recovery mostly reutilized Soviet-era capacity, while China built new productive capacity.”
- Blank observes, “China’s rising influence impedes Japanese and South Korean investment in the Russian Far East, further deepening Moscow’s reliance on Beijing.”
- He warns, “In effect, Russia’s stalled development has consigned it to being China’s ‘junior partner,’ especially as China has more leverage over North Korea.”
- Blank concludes, “Without successful development of the Russian Far East, Russia lacks both the means to effectively assert itself in Asia and to create a balance of power in Northeast Asia, leaving China the clear winner.”
- Duesterberg writes that Trump’s “hard-hitting sanctions…can deliver a serious blow to the teetering Russian economy, if they’re rigorously enforced—and Trump sticks to his guns.”
- He emphasizes, “Trump’s order allows, for the first time, sanctions against buyers of Russian oil and banks that finance trade in that oil, including those in China, Hong Kong and India,” noting that “similar restrictions announced afterward by the European Union add to the impact.”
- “His new sanctions started getting results immediately. One day after they were imposed, China’s major state oil companies announced that they were pausing purchases of Russian oil.”
- “India, too, may be ready to slow its imports” as the new sanctions target refined products, and India’s Reliance Industries has “signaled it may suspend imports.”
- “The Russian economy faces severe problems… Liquidity in its sovereign wealth fund has dwindled to less than 3% of GDP, and it’s having a hard time selling bonds to cover its budget deficit.”
- Duesterberg argues that “global prices have remained moderate” due to high U.S. and Saudi production, so “even after the new sanctions were announced, both the Brent and West Texas benchmarks remain between $60 and $65 per barrel, hardly a price harmful to Western economies.”
- He concludes, “Trump has sent the strongest message yet to Xi about the costs of supporting his Russian friend for life… There are real concessions to be won. They hinge on rigorous sanctions enforcement against both Russia and the buyers of its energy exports.”
Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally
- Kolyandr writes that “Europe appears to have agreed to provide Kyiv with a ‘reparations loan’ secured by Russian assets—but is unable to implement that plan due to resistance from Belgium,” even as “western countries have frozen Russian assets… believed to be at least $335 billion.”
- The main obstacle is Russian state (central bank) assets, which “are protected by both the law and established practice,” with most “in accounts at the Euroclear depository located in Belgium.”
- Currently only the interest earned on Russian sovereign assets is transferred to Ukraine—“in 2024, the income from interest amounted to 6.9 billion euros”—but “Kyiv needs about $100 billion a year, and Trump’s return to power… has escalated the problem to a new level.”
- The EU’s proposed plan: a $140 billion “reparations loan” backed by frozen Russian assets, which Ukraine “will only pay… once Russia pays for the reparations.” Kolyandr notes, “frozen Russian assets will serve as collateral, but that will not affect property rights.”
- Beyond European legal and liability worries, he highlights the Russian response: “Russia partially froze foreign assets on its territory to stem capital outflow. Foreigners from ‘unfriendly’ countries lost the right to sell their assets in Russia.”
- Kolyandr warns, “transferring funds to Ukraine could have the unintended effect of indirectly boosting Russian military spending,” due to Russia’s ability to nationalize or redirect Western-owned assets.
- He concludes: “given the lack of funds to support Ukraine, the adoption of some sort of scheme to appropriate Russia’s assets seems all but inevitable… if these efforts fail, it will not just be Ukraine that is at risk, but the very raison d’être of the EU.”
See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
For sanctions on the energy sector, please see section “Energy exports from CIS” below.
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Russia in Review, Oct. 24–31, 2025
Cyber security
- Russian authorities have seized control of Usersbox, the country’s most popular Telegram bot for accessing personal data, and detained its owner following a search of his apartment, Istories reported Friday. The bot, which previously published border-crossing data from the FSB’s “Kordon 2023” database, is now offline. The raid comes amid a broader crackdown on data leaks, with new laws signed in late 2024 introducing penalties of up to 10 years in prison for illegal use of personal data. (Istories, 10.31.25)
- Russian lawmakers continue to rely on Telegram as their main channel of communication with the public despite a Kremlin directive urging them to switch to the state-backed messenger app Max, according to a study cited by the Kommersant business daily on Friday. (MT/AFP, 10.31.25)
Belarus
- No significant developments.
Cyber
- Russian authorities have seized control of Usersbox, the country’s most popular Telegram bot for accessing personal data, and detained its owner following a search of his apartment, Istories reported Friday. The bot, which previously published border-crossing data from the FSB’s “Kordon 2023” database, is now offline. The raid comes amid a broader crackdown on data leaks, with new laws signed in late 2024 introducing penalties of up to 10 years in prison for illegal use of personal data. (Istories, 10.31.25)
- Russian lawmakers continue to rely on Telegram as their main channel of communication with the public despite a Kremlin directive urging them to switch to the state-backed messenger app Max, according to a study cited by the Kommersant business daily on Friday. (MT/AFP, 10.31.25)
Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally
- The Russian authorities are discussing an increase in duties on strong alcohol from “unfriendly” countries from January 1, 2026, RBC writes with reference to three sources on the market. (MT/AFP, 10.31.25)
For sanctions on the energy sector, please see section “Energy exports from CIS” below.
